Governing Faith: China’s Sinicization of Islam in the Uyghur Region

By Uyghur Times Staff

A mosque in Kashgar stands shuttered, its dome removed, Arabic inscriptions replaced by Chinese slogans, and a red banner reading “Love the Party, Love the Motherland” stretched across its entrance. Surveillance cameras monitor every movement, leaving worshippers wary of participating in religious life. This scene, captured in June 2017, illustrates the wider reality of China’s Sinicization of Islam in the Uyghur region, also known as East Turkestan.

A report by Uyghur Rights Monitor, authored by Erk Altay, details how Chinese authorities have systematically restructured Islamic life, treating ordinary religious observance as a threat to state security. Over the past decade, policies have included mosque demolitions, restrictions on religious education, and criminalization of everyday practices such as prayer, fasting, wearing religious attire, and conducting aqiqah or nikah ceremonies.

Policy Origins and Early Restrictions

According to the report, the policy of Sinicization was formally directed by President Xi Jinping at the Central United Front Work Conference in May 2015, instructing authorities to ensure all religions “adhere to the direction of Sinicization.” In the Uyghur region, this has meant that Sunni Muslim practices are tightly controlled, subordinating religion to Party authority.

The roots of religious restriction stretch back decades. In the 1990s, authorities institutionalized religious securitization, expanding in the 2000s through the “Strike Hard” campaign that targeted alleged separatists. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese government linked Uyghur Islamic practices to global terrorism to justify international repression. After the 2009 Urumqi unrest, Islam in the region was increasingly framed as an ideological threat, prompting surveillance, mass arrests, and the closure of unofficial madrasa-style education.

By the Second Xinjiang Work Forum in 2014, Xi Jinping declared “social stability and long-term security” the region’s primary governance objective. This set the stage for a security-oriented administrative framework that has enabled mass arbitrary detention, forced sterilization, family separation, cultural erasure, and suppression of the Uyghur language.

Institutionalizing Religious Control

According to the report, Sinicization operates through a structured chain of command. The United Front Work Department sets ideological direction, the Religious Affairs Bureau manages mosque registration and inspections, and the Xinjiang Islamic Association implements policy locally through sermon guidance, imam training, and day-to-day mosque management.

Two internal CCP directives have codified this approach. Document No. 5 (2017) emphasized strengthening identification with the Party, motherland, nation, culture, and socialism with Chinese characteristics. Document No. 10 (2018) labeled “Arabization” and “Saudization” as ideological threats, directing mosque redesigns, restrictions on Arabic instruction, limits on halal labeling, and political training for imams.

A 2019 Five-Year Plan further required imams to integrate socialist values into sermons and education. By 2024, regional law formalized these policies, requiring government approval for religious gatherings and mandating that all doctrine align with “contemporary Chinese development and excellent traditional culture.”

Transformation of Religious Spaces

According to the report, The authorities have also reshaped Islamic architecture and sacred sites. Satellite imagery indicates at least 8,500 mosques—more than one-third of all mosques in the Uyghur region—have been demolished since 2017, with field investigations suggesting the number may exceed 16,000.

Remaining mosques often have domes and minarets removed, Arabic inscriptions replaced with Chinese slogans, and Chinese flags installed at entrances. Sacred Sufi shrines, including Imam Asim and Ordam, have been destroyed or repurposed. Some mosques have been converted into shops, bars, or community centers.

Even open mosques operate under surveillance. In May 2025, observers at the Dongkowruk Mosque in Urumqi noted sermons delivered in Mandarin from state-issued regulations rather than traditional Islamic texts. Qurans were largely absent, and attendance was limited to elderly congregants.

Surveillance and Criminalization

The report highlights that, the Sinicization framework extends into private homes. Programs like “Becoming Family” embed officials in Uyghur households to monitor prayer and fasting. Civil servants, students, and teachers face strict prohibitions on observing religious rituals.

The 2017 Regulation on De-extremification criminalizes practices such as wearing the hijab, sporting beards, conducting nikah ceremonies, or possessing religious texts. Leaked Xinjiang Police Files show extreme penalties: children punished retrospectively for Quran study, imams imprisoned for decades, and ordinary believers detained for attending unauthorized prayers.

Authorities have centralized sermon content, promoting ethnic unity, loyalty to the Party, and the Five Identifications, while restricting Arabic instruction. In 2025, the China Islamic Association replaced its long-standing green emblem containing Islamic imagery with a simplified blue logo, emphasizing national identity over religious symbolism.

Ideological Control and State Messaging

State media and officials frame Sinicization as modernization and patriotic education. Party representatives direct mosque curricula and sermons, while official rhetoric presents religious reform as necessary for social cohesion. A 2024 inspection report noted that Islamic curricula were “integrated with Chinese traditional culture and adapted to socialist society” to promote a “Chinese national community.”

Authorities have also sought to manage the international narrative. Curated media tours and visits from Muslim-majority countries portray Islam in the region as thriving, despite evidence of repression. In September 2025, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari visited the Id Kah Mosque, praising its facilities while the public call to prayer remained absent.

Independent reporting contradicts these narratives. Journalists visiting the region in 2025 documented widespread mosque closures, demolition, and conversion to non-religious use. Even the Id Kah Mosque functioned largely as a cultural exhibit, with restricted access and minimal visible worship.

Daily Life Under Sinicization

For Uyghurs, religious life is tightly constrained. Daily observance is monitored, imams operate under political supervision, and mosques are semi-policed zones. Women face restrictions on veiling, men risk detention for prayer outside state-approved sites, and children are barred from religious education in schools.

Authorities enforce regulations through inspections, digital surveillance, and mandatory reporting by clerics and “model believers.” Ramadan observance, in particular, is heavily restricted, with residents required to provide video proof of eating during fasting hours.

Ongoing Implications

The policies first implemented in the Uyghur region now serve as a model for broader religious governance in China. Surveillance, standardized sermons, architectural redesign, and doctrinal supervision are being applied in other regions, suggesting Sinicization is embedded as a permanent framework.

At the Id Kah Mosque and elsewhere, the gap between official claims of religious freedom and lived reality remains stark. Mosques operate under Party control, religious texts are censored or annotated to align with state ideology, and ordinary Uyghurs must navigate a landscape where faith and politics are inseparable.