Opinion:Uyghurs in Syria, Trapped Between West’s Double Standards and Chinese Threat

By Umun Ihsan

The hours when the evening call to prayer echoes through the dusty streets of Idlib form one of the most frequently recounted scenes of the lives of the Uyghurs living in the region: boys and girls speaking Uyghur in narrow neighborhoods, women brewing tea over open fires, and Uyghur fighters keeping watch in war-torn buildings.

This scene presents a silent picture of a reality the world has long struggled to understand. There is an ambiguity in the international discourse regarding the position of the Uyghur actors in Syria, who are trapped between the West’s stance and China’s oppressive policies.

Confusion Regarding the Organization’s Name

The East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) was founded in September 1997. In the international public sphere, China labeled the organization as the “East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM).” However, the organization itself never adopted the name East Turkistan Islamic Movement.

After 2001, the military and political conjuncture in Afghanistan changed rapidly. Turkic-origin groups began arriving in the region from Central Asia. Aiming to integrate these Turkic-origin groups and establish relations with them, the organization’s leaders changed the name of the East Turkistan Islamic Party to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). This was a strategic decision intended to increase the organization’s effectiveness. According to the organization’s deputy leader, Abdus Salam Turkistani, the goal of this change was to broaden the name to encompass all Turkic peoples and Uyghurs living in Central Asia.

After 2018, the organization in Syria was restructured. Its leaders repeatedly stated that their strategic goals were focused on East Turkistan.

Three months after the overthrow of the Ba’ath regime, the organization released an official statement announcing that it had reverted its name to the East Turkistan Islamic Party. In June 2025, members of the East Turkistan Islamic Party were integrated into the 84th Division of the Syrian Army. The organization subsequently dissolved itself.

The Uyghurs in Syria now identify themselves as the Uyghur Community in Syria.

Sources close to the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) claim that the TIP came to Syria at the invitation of al-Qaeda and its controlled local armed groups after the Syrian Civil War began in 2011. Specifically, it was al-Nusra Front, al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, that invited the TIP. Al-Nusra was established in 2011 to fight against the Assad regime. Through a process of distancing itself from al-Qaeda in 2016-2017, al-Nusra evolved into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Abu Mohammed al-Jolani (Ahmed al-Sharaa) shifted the organization’s global jihadist tendency to a more “localist” (Syria-focused) one.

According to some experts, this transformation was more aligned with the TIP’s historically local and ethnically-based goals.

In a 2002 interview with Radio Free Asia, Hasan Mahsum, the founder of the ETIM (East Turkistan Islamic Movement, a previous name for TIP), condemned the 9/11 attacks, stating that his organization had “no organizational or financial ties” with al-Qaeda or the Taliban. This indicated that the movement initially focused on local independence goals against Beijing, rather than global jihad.

That same year, the US designation of the ETIM as a terrorist group offered a huge opportunity for China. Beijing used the post-9/11 security atmosphere to internationally frame the Uyghur movement as “terrorist” and systematically began to criminalize Uyghurs.

Due to US operations in Afghanistan, the ETIM sought sanctuary from the Taliban during its early days. These contacts remained limited during Mahsum’s leadership; the real rapprochement strengthened with Abdul Haq, who took over leadership in 2003.

Throughout the wars in Syria and Afghanistan, the TIP maintained its relations with both al-Qaeda and the Taliban—which was the only realistic alternative given the conditions on the ground. As an armed group of Turkic origin in the Middle East, they needed local allies for survival, military training, and resources.

The Syrian war was a turning point for the TIP. In 2013-2014, the TIP organized Uyghur fighters arriving in Syria, formed an alliance with Nusra, and strengthened its ties through joint actions like the 2015 Jisr al-Shughur operation. By 2017, the TIP had become HTS’s largest and most loyal foreign ally in Syria. Both groups were shifting their strategies away from global jihadism toward a local independence struggle.

During this process, the TIP also took on important mediation roles among local groups. In 2020, the TIP mediated a conflict between HTS and Hurras al-Din (al-Qaeda loyalists). This demonstrated that the TIP viewed HTS as a “brother group” and that its al-Qaeda connections were still ongoing.

TIP’s Strategic Transformation and Pragmatic Alliances in Syria

Between 2005 and 2019, the TIP viewed al-Qaeda as a strategic ally. Joint operations in Syria and Afghanistan reinforced this relationship. However, the TIP continued to act as a pragmatic and rational actor rather than a fully radicalized jihadist group.

When Nusra was al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, it was in close cooperation with the TIP, conducting joint operations. When Nusra broke away from al-Qaeda to form HTS, the TIP alliance continued. When HTS clashed with al-Qaeda-aligned Hurras al-Din, the TIP remained neutral. Even after Hurras al-Din was eliminated, the TIP continued its fight against Assad alongside HTS.

In 2018, according to interviews with its leaders, the TIP was restructured, and its relations with the Uyghur community in Afghanistan were limited. Researchers note that the vast majority of Uyghurs reaching Syria came via Turkey, with those originating from Afghanistan forming a small minority. This detail offers a critical clue for understanding the changes in the TIP’s strategies and tactics in Syria.

TIP’s Balancing Act in the Middle East and the Local-Focused Evolution of Jihadism

Despite being a small armed group, the TIP skillfully maintained a balance among major players in the Middle East. It survived without being overwhelmed or dismantled by forces like the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and HTS, played the winning side in Afghanistan and Syria, and increased its effectiveness. Despite its past connections to terrorist organizations, its political and military decisions led it to be viewed as a rational actor in the region.

From the 2020s onwards, HTS and TIP distanced themselves from global jihadism, shifting their strategies toward local independence goals. Their official rhetoric and propaganda no longer emphasized a global caliphate or anti-Western sentiment. One sought the freedom of Syria, and the other sought the independence of East Turkistan.

TIP’s International Communication and China-Focused Strategy

In recent years, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) has been attempting to reshape its international perception. In September 2021, a representative from the TIP’s political office told Newsweek, following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, that the organization viewed the US as a potential ally against China.

In October 2022, TIP Deputy Abdusalam al-Turkistani, in a call via Telegram, stated, “We are not terrorists, we are not a threat to any country… We are ready to cooperate with every country and individual to fight against China,” emphasizing their distance from al-Qaeda’s anti-Western propaganda and that their priority was national liberation.

In December 2022, the TIP called the US removal of ETIM from its terror list a “victory against China’s lies,” stating in their announcement that they harbored no hostility toward the West and were solely focused on China. By doing so, they denied al-Qaeda ties and prioritized the search for international support. In April 2025, a TIP spokesman told Foreign Policy that they had no goals for international terror campaigns and no ties to al-Qaeda, rejecting attacks and stressing the goal of East Turkistan’s independence.

TIP and Turkey’s Relationship

Since the TIP is one of HTS’s most powerful armed groups on critical fronts, the TIP was indirectly included in joint operations conducted by HTS and other opposition groups supported by Turkey (some components of the Syrian National Army – SNA). This suggests that Turkey provided a de facto operational convenience to the TIP, without providing direct support, through groups fighting a common enemy.

While Turkey officially keeps the TIP on its terror list, some sources indicate that Turkey provided logistical ease for the organization’s recruitment efforts. Although official statements emphasize that there is no formal relationship between the TIP and Turkey, the fact that the TIP conducts operations against the regime alongside HTS, whom Turkey supports, raises questions about the extent to which this official rhetoric reflects reality, especially given Turkey’s search for regional alliances against the YPG and its traditional sensitivity to the Uyghur issue.

UN and US “Terrorists”

20 years ago, the UN and the US listed the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) as a terrorist organization, alleging its connections to al-Qaeda.

It is known that the TIP received resources, sanctuary, and military training support from al-Qaeda during the war in Afghanistan. However, aside from the militant wars in Syria and Afghanistan, there are no recorded joint terror-themed operations between the TIP and al-Qaeda.

The key evidence relied upon by the UN and the US to designate the TIP as a terrorist organization concentrates on two points: first, allegations that Abdul Haq al-Turkistani was the TIP leader and a member of al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. Second, physical evidence presented by China to the UN. (However, the reliability of this evidence is debatable due to the genocide claims against China and the strict restrictions China places on media and researchers.)

The TIP’s Relationship with Al-Qaeda: Purely Tactical Alliance or Deep Ideological Unity?

According to intellectuals who have recently had the opportunity to visit and observe the situation in Syria, the senior leadership of the Uyghur armed structure in Syria categorically denies the allegations regarding its relationship with al-Qaeda or the group being under al-Qaeda’s influence. Experts visiting the region also state that the TIP was restructured in 2018 and has no institutional relationship with al-Qaeda.

Some experts suggest that the TIP has adopted the “localist” model of HTS to survive in Syria, attempting to evade international sanctions by appearing “moderate,” much like HTS leader Jolani. They also note that these statements by the TIP align with al-Qaeda’s recent strategy of allowing its affiliated groups greater local autonomy.

However, experts working on the subject assess the situation quite differently.

Reports from HSToday (2025) and Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS, 2017) characterize the TIP’s role in Syria as “opportunistic.” They indicate that while the group established close ties with al-Qaeda, its main objective remains limited to “liberating Xinjiang.”

The Jamestown Foundation (2019) emphasizes that the TIP receives ideological and financial support from al-Qaeda but focuses on Uyghur resistance rather than a transnational threat. Sources like CFR and the Long War Journal also support these assessments.

Furthermore, the “jihadist” accusations leveled against the TIP seem to contradict the functioning and local-focused structure of the Uyghur community in Syria.

The TIP’s Uyghur Ethnic Community in Syria: Schools, Mosques, and Identity Preservation

Uyghur family settlements in the Idlib countryside bear the marks of a community striving to preserve its ethnic identity amidst the war. One can see Uyghur signage, Turkistan flags, and small market stalls in the vicinity.

The TIP has established an ethnic-based “community” for Uyghur fighters and their families, particularly in Idlib and the northwestern regions. This structure strengthens the organization’s local-focused strategy, prioritizing the preservation of Uyghur identity over global jihad.

Camps and schools established since 2015 provide children with education in the Uyghur language, history, religion, sciences (biology, mathematics), and military training. These educational institutions function as essential tools for preserving and transmitting Uyghur identity to the next generation.

Independent researcher Abduweli Ayup examined the textbooks in these schools during his visit to Syria. The content of the books was adapted from older textbooks used in the Uyghur region, with communist propaganda removed and some religious phrases added. Lessons emphasize Uyghur national heroes and ethnic themes, instilling a strong sense of ethnic identity and belonging in the children.

Uyghur fighters in Syria perform communal prayers in mosques and organize sermons in their own language. According to an April 2025 report by Foreign Policy, these acts of worship reinforce Uyghur ethnic identity, merging with the TIP’s emphasis on “Turkism” (Türkçülük).

An Economist report from January 2025 states that the TIP hangs Uyghur flags in mosques and conducts anti-China propaganda. These practices demonstrate how religious rituals are intertwined with ethnic identity and political messaging.

Anthropologist Rune Steenberg from Palacký University’s Department of Asian Studies interviewed the Uyghur community and fighters in Idlib a year ago. According to Steenberg, the schools, commercial activities, and military camps established by the Uyghurs are effective practices designed to preserve their ethnic identity and existence.

The researcher notes that the Uyghurs in Syria have a strong sense of nationalism and that their form of Islamic belief heavily features Central Asian Turkic traditions. Steenberg describes these Uyghurs not as “jihadists” but as a community seeking independence through armed struggle.

While Rune Steenberg emphasizes the Uyghurs’ intention to liberate East Turkistan through arms, he conveys that they believe preserving their military traditions and ethnic existence is a more realistic strategy under current circumstances.

There are between 2,000 and 5,000 Uyghur fighters and their families in Syria. The Carnegie Endowment (2017) states that this community is “ethnic and territorially focused” and has avoided al-Qaeda’s divisive policies.

As of 2025, the Uyghur community in Syria has become formalized. Former TIP leaders informed researchers that they now wish to be referred to simply as the “Uyghur community in Syria.” The term Turkistan Islamic Party appears to have been abandoned by this community recently.

Tactical Strategy and Uyghur Resistance

Experts suggest that the TIP’s alliance with al-Qaeda was mostly tactical, used as a means to ensure the survival of the Uyghur community in Syria. On the other hand, a half-century of diaspora lobbying and political initiatives have generally been fruitless. This situation fuels anger among Uyghurs, and the genocide process experienced since 2016 has created the groundwork for this anger to rapidly turn into action.

In his two visits to Syria in 2025, independent researcher Abduweli Ayup emphasized that peaceful initiatives have gone unanswered and that possessing armed force gives Uyghurs hope and confidence. Ayup legitimizes the Uyghurs’ will to protect their rights and resist persecution, stating: “International justice and law do not provide direct armed protection; in this case, Uyghurs must protect themselves. The Uyghurs in Syria have not abandoned the will to liberate East Turkistan. I no longer see the Uyghurs in Syria as part of international jihadism.”

Double Standards: The West’s Different Approaches to HTS and TIP

The West engages in diplomatic relations with HTS by exempting its institutional structure and main leaders from terror-related restrictions, sending aid, and praising Ahmed al-Sharaa as a “pragmatic leader,” even hosting him in Western capitals with magnificent ceremonies. In contrast, the Uyghur/TIP fighters who have fought shoulder-to-shoulder with HTS for over a decade and are integrated into the Syrian army are still labeled as “foreign terrorists / al-Qaeda affiliated.” Security reports continue to list the TIP as a “danger.”

According to most analysts, the West was forced to accept HTS due to the demands of Realpolitik to build stability in Syria. Yet, the strategies, relationships, ideological frameworks, and political tactics of the TIP and HTS are largely similar. Despite this, the West appears to have singled out the TIP to “avoid rewarding foreign jihadists”: while cooperation with HTS continues, the TIP is still defined as terrorist.

Some concessions have occurred. The US has tolerated the participation of foreign fighters (including Uyghurs) in the new Syrian army but has not removed the TIP from its official terror lists. Thus, there is acceptance in practice but a “terrorist” status on paper. HTS has been placed in the “former terrorist but partner” category.

The TIP has followed a similar strategy. It currently operates under HTS’s umbrella and shows efforts at adaptation in Syria. However, the TIP is not pardoned by the West because it is “foreign”; it still carries the “terrorist” label in the security narrative.

This distinction has no ideological or legal basis; it is entirely political and pragmatic. This situation demonstrates how selectively the West applies its Realpolitik priorities and international counter-terrorism narratives in Syria.

In summary: The West pardoned HTS because it was forced to for stability and pragmatic cooperation in Syria; it is not pardoning the TIP because it is not compelled to. Thus, HTS is the “partner,” and the TIP remains the “foreign terrorist.”

The change in HTS’s status could theoretically reduce the pressure on Uyghurs in Syria. Although TIP leaders emphasize their nationalist motivations and abandonment of former global jihadism, the West still perceives the Uyghurs in Syria as a radical element.

For the Uyghurs in Syria, who have participated in conflicts in Afghanistan and Syria for years and have a traumatic history in China, religion is central to life. However, field research shows that the Uyghurs in Syria use religion as a strategic tool to reinforce Uyghur nationalism and support their local goals. While the authority of religion is strong in education and community life, this authority does not harm nationalistic aims or undermine their goals.

According to Rune Steenberg, the Uyghurs in Syria are not terrorists. Portraying them as such is part of Chinese propaganda, even “a political tactic invented to criminalize Uyghurs.”

However, it is also clear that they do not meet Western standards on issues like women’s rights, democracy, and human rights. Future internal policy decisions by the Syrian government could affect the TIP’s position. The more secular the government becomes, the path followed by the TIP may change accordingly.

Are the Uyghurs in Syria Safe?

The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to Beijing in November 2025 emphasized “counter-terrorism” and economic cooperation between the two countries. While support for Syria was pledged in talks with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, allegations of the extradition of Uyghur fighters to China surfaced in the background of the visit.

According to AFP, diplomatic sources claimed that Syria was planning to extradite approximately 400 Uyghur fighters. This threatens the HTS-integrated Uyghur community in Idlib. The Syrian Foreign Ministry denied the claims on November 17, stating there was “no plan for extradition.” Carnegie Endowment reports suggest that such an initiative could also affect Syria’s stability.

In conclusion, these developments make the future of Uyghurs in Syria uncertain, potentially accelerating the community’s search for international protection under the pressure of China. Uyghur intellectuals and diaspora representatives, stating that the extradition claims might be “an extension of Chinese propaganda,” are demanding an independent investigation.

Uyghur activist Abduweli Ayup says the Uyghur fighters in Syria are not currently at serious risk but emphasizes that the situation could change in the future. Ayup states, “These groups played a role in the fight against the Assad regime. Therefore, it is unlikely they will be completely ignored or easily handed over to China.”

According to Ayup, the Damascus government might position these groups within its own security strategy: “The Syrian government could protect them. If they are allowed to maintain their identity, they can continue to contribute to the country’s peace and security.”

In short, Ayup expresses that the future of the Uyghur fighters remains uncertain, dependent on Syria’s political calculations.

According to experts monitoring the region, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) could face serious backlash, both in the West and in regional countries, if they involve themselves in the Syrian internal conflict, particularly in an intervention against Kurdish forces. Such a move would further weaken the organization’s already controversial position and deepen the international perception of “terror.” Experts emphasize that the perception of Kurdish groups as legitimate actors in the fight against ISIS would further isolate the TIP, increasing pressure on the organization from the Syrian government and regional powers.

The TIP, similar to Uyghur diasporas worldwide, sees the West as a potential ally against China. If the US were to consider granting the TIP such a role, there would likely be prerequisites. Primarily, the TIP would need to completely abandon its jihadist ideology and become a political and nationalist movement focused solely on China. Additionally, from the US perspective, the TIP would need to be an actor that is compatible with and controllable within its China strategy.

Many believe that a possible Taiwan war or a potential escalation in the South China Sea would increase the importance of groups like the TIP, potentially leading to them becoming an internationally supported actor in such a scenario.

Conclusion

In one of the neighborhoods of Idlib, Uyghur women gathered in a sunny apartment in an old building are threading needles into colorful fabrics on a thin rug laid by the wall. Some are teaching children the Uyghur alphabet, while others are whispering old homeland stories to instill a sense of identity in the children.

The room smells faintly of fabric, while the noise of Uyghur children playing in the streets comes from outside. These domestic cultural activities circulating among the women function like an invisible skeleton holding together a fading identity in the midst of war.

This small room is one of the least-known but most resilient places in Syria. These are the women who, in the shadow of armed fronts, organize to protect their identity, silently reproduce their culture, and establish their own front within the home against the uncertain future of the diaspora.

The recent Damascus-Beijing rapprochement, however, is again making the future of Uyghurs in Syria uncertain. The schools, mosques, markets, and family settlements they established amidst the war reflect the Uyghur community’s will to survive. The Uyghurs in Syria are still caught between major powers today, but they have not lost their determination to preserve their existence.

Note:This article was originally published by Uyghur Post, a newly founded Uyghur-language media outlet and partner publication of Uyghur Times. It has been translated and republished by Uyghur Times.

İhsan Ismail is a Paris-based Uyghur reporter, editor, and analyst with a background in sociology and French studies. He writes on human rights, diaspora issues, and global affairs for the newly founded Uyghur-language media outlet, the Uyghur Post. A graduate of Akdeniz University in Turkey (2020), he has reported for Radio Free Asia and written for Turkish outlets such as Medyascope, Gazete Duvar, and Serbestiyet. His work spans journalism, analysis, and literature, with poems published in Uyghur anthologies. İhsan writes in Uyghur, Turkish, and French.